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BOOK REVIEW
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor in the
Nineteenth Century
(A Response to Gunther Peck)
ROBERT J. STEINFELDt
Ordinarily I do not respond to reviews (nothing could be
less interesting than two academics crossing swords over
obscure footnotes), but recently a review of my book
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor In the Nineteenth
Century appeared in this journal and presented such a
serious misreading of the book that I feel compelled to set
the record straight, to make clear precisely what the book is
and is not about. '
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor was written against
a particular historical tradition. The reviewer, who
otherwise seemed so concerned about historiography,
ironically failed to appreciate the importance of this
tradition, and as a result missed, for the most part, the
point of the book. This historical tradition presumes that
wage labor in Great Britain and the United States over the
last two centuries normally took the form of employment at
will and was a natural outcome of the operation of free
markets. To be sure, this tradition has been modified in
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. See Gunther Peck, Contracting Coercion? Rethinking the Origins of Free
Labor in Great Britain and the United States, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 201 (2003)
(reviewing ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001)).
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recent years thanks to the work of a number of historians
(Willy Forbath, Amy Stanley, and Christopher Tomlins
among others) who have pointed to the variety Of ways in
which class legislation added to the subordination of wage
workers-laws that outlawed or restricted union activity,
laws that imposed harsh terms on poor relief, laws that
gave workers no legal redress for workplace accidents, and
vagrancy laws that could be used to pressure the
unemployed into work. These writers have added
immeasurably to our understanding of the numerous ways
in which the state operated to support employers in their
efforts to extract labor at the lowest possible price, but they
have not directly addressed the notion that wage labor
normally took the form of employment at will-with all the
connotations traditionally associated with it.
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor demonstrates that
over the century following the Industrial Revolution a
significant portion of the skilled manufacturing wage labor
force in both Britain and the United States did not work as
employees at will but under contracts that bound them to
continue in their jobs for shorter or longer periods of time.
These contracts were enforced through harsh remedies for
breaches-prison terms in the British case and wage
forfeiture in the American. This evidence is important
because it alters our basic understanding of the economic
dynamics of wage labor in the first century of
industrialization. The story of wage labor as employment at
will has traditionally been tied up with a particular account
of the nature of wage labor markets. In this account wage
labor markets are governed by the law of the vast reserve
army of the unemployed. The coercion in wage labor
markets is an economic coercion that grows out of the fear
of unemployment. The main disciplinary power of
employers is the power not to offer work except on
extremely harsh terms and the power to fire peremptorily
for any infraction of an employer's unilaterally imposed
work requirements. In this account employment at will is
an optimum employer strategy for extracting cheap labor
because wage labor markets are permanently overcrowded.
Under these conditions labor contracts for a term make no
economic sense from an employer's perspective.
And yet what the evidence presented in Coercion,
Contract and Free Labor reveals is that employers in both
Britain and the United States often did rely on such
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contracts. This evidence necessarily forces reconsideration
of the employment at will picture of wage labor and of the
nature of wage labor markets during the nineteenth
century. It turns out that in the normal operation of the
trade cycle periodic shortages of skilled manufacturing
wage labor regularly developed. Unemployment among
skilled manufacturing wage workers in England, for
example, has been estimated to have been below 4 percent
in 11 of the 15 years between 1860 and 1875.2 Under such
labor market conditions employers benefited economically
by using labor contracts to bind their workers to jobs for
shorter or longer periods. In England, prosecutions for labor
contract breaches normally soared in years when skilled
unemployment was low. But employers also used binding
labor contracts as an additional disciplinary device to
enforce work requirements. Failure to obey orders at work
represented a breach of contract and could be punished by
imprisonment or wage forfeiture. The widespread use of
enforceable contracts in wage labor necessarily alters basic
understandings about the nature of wage labor following
the onset of industrialization.
These findings are significant in a second way. They
alter the larger picture historians have developed about the
forms labor typically took in the English/American
metropolitan core vs. the forms it typically took in the
periphery of an expanding capitalist universe. Over recent
decades historians have become increasingly aware of just
how common coerced labor was in the periphery of the new
world economy in the nineteenth century. Quite frequently
this coerced labor took the form of indented or contract
labor in which a principal source of the coercion came from
the labor contracts themselves, which could be legally
enforced against workers through the use of bodily coercion:
corporal punishment or imprisonment. These historians of
coerced labor in the periphery generally presume that
contractual coercion of this kind was a departure from the
norm, the supposed norm being the employment at will of
the metropolitan core.
Some of these historians have developed explanations
for this departure from the norm of free labor. One popular
explanation holds that the widespread availability of land
2. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 76-77 (2001).
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and the scarcity of labor in the periphery compelled
employers to resort to coerced labor to obtain and hold
workers. In the metropolitan core by contrast wage labor
markets were overcrowded and land was not freely
available, hence employers had no need to bother with
contracts that were legally enforceable through bodily
coercion; they could simply rely on the coercion of the
market.
The finding that in England it was common for
employers to use such contracts explodes this picture of the
qualitatively different forms that labor took in the core vs.
the periphery. Simultaneously, it discredits attempts to
explain these supposed differences by reference to the
abundance or scarcity of land or labor. In England land was
certainly not freely available and there was no general
scarcity of labor; yet employers found good economic
reasons for using criminally enforceable labor contracts.
Employers also found solid economic reasons, however, for
resorting to labor contracts that could be enforced bodily in
the periphery where land was freely available and labor
was scarce. Hence, the general abundance or scarcity of
land or labor do not explain why labor contracts enforceable
through bodily coercion were used in certain places.
Employers found uses for such contracts where land was
abundant and labor scarce but also where land was scarce
and labor was abundant. Yet there were places where labor
contracts were not ordinarily enforced through bodily
coercion. The northern United States after the 1830s is an
example. If land/labor ratios cannot explain the absence or
presence of bodily coercion in labor contracts what can?
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor makes very clear that an
explanation has to be sought in factors other than land
availability and labor scarcity.
Whether labor was compelled through non-pecuniary pressures
seems to have depended on whether the state was willing to
authorize imprisonment for breaches of labor agreements.
Furthermore, this decision does not seem to have depended on
whether labor was abundant or scarce. However abundant labor
may generally have been, conditions arose in advanced market
economies that made the enforcement of labor through the threat
of physical confinement economically beneficial for employers. On
the other hand, however scarce labor may have been, a state might
still balk at authorizing the use of certain kinds of pressures to
compel labor. As a general matter it seems pretty clear that
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employers of both waged and contract labor would ordinarily have
wanted to possess the legal power to use non-pecuniary pressure
to enforce labor contracts. Only where states failed to cooperate
with these ambitions would we expect employers not to possess
3
this kind of power.
The crucial factors in determining whether bodily
coercion occurred in labor relations were political, legal and
normative-not the scarcity or abundance of land or labor.
As to why bodily coercion was not ordinarily permitted to
enforce labor contracts in the northern United States after
the 1830s the book is equally clear.
[A]merican contract rules that foreclosed the use of criminal
sanctions to enforce labor agreements have to be understood as
decisions taken by northern polities through their legal systems to
authorize certain kinds of pressures in labor relations, but not
others. Local political (including the scope of the suffrage), legal,
cultural and economic conditions all played roles in the adoption
and maintenance of these rules. They were a product of a long and
complex history of conflict. What emerged from this history was a
collective determination in most places in the North, and later in
the United States as a whole, to outlaw slavery, and along with it4
forms of labor directly analogous to slavery.
Before I turn to address some of the criticisms leveled
against the book there is one additional aspect of the
argument of Coercion, Contract and Free Labor that I
should mention. The use of bodily coercion to enforce labor
contracts in England during the nineteenth century raises a
fundamental issue. Today it is an uncontroversial
proposition, accepted even by staunch conservatives,5 that
the use of bodily coercion or criminal punishment to enforce
labor contracts makes labor involuntary servitude. But in
the nineteenth century despite the use of these kinds of
threats in English wage labor that labor was commonly
classified as free labor. This change raises a fundamental
issue about how labor comes to be classified as coerced or
free. Coercion, Contract and Free Labor argues that neither
free nor coerced labor exist independently of social, legal, or
political convention but involve judgments about which
3. Id. at 83.
4. Id. at 35.
5. See generally United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1987) (Opinion of
Justice O'Connor).
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forms of pressure applied in labor relations produce coerced
labor and which do not. And these judgments do and have
changed, as the case of bodily coercion in English wage
labor makes clear.
How the line between free and coerced labor is drawn is
a matter of convention but is often also highly controversial.
In the nineteenth century, many working people and
advocates for working people denounced wage labor as a
form of "slavery" because they viewed the economic
pressures that compelled ordinary people to labor long
hours at taxing and dangerous jobs for low pay as a form of
coerced labor. But the view that market pressures create
coerced, as opposed to free, labor was a controversial
proposition then and remains so.6 It has become even more
controversial today with the nearly total triumph of neo-
liberal ideas. The book argues that the fact that it is
uncontroversial that threats involving the deprivation of
bodily liberty yield coerced labor while it remains
controversial that threats involving economic pressures can
ever produce coerced labor is the result of a deep seated
assumption that bodily coercion operates completely
differently than economic pressure in the way it works in
labor relations. In light of the near hegemony of neo-liberal
ideas it is no longer sufficient to rely on old shibboleths and
passionate denunciations. Coercion, Contract and Free
Labor aims to produce, as rigorously as possible, a
demonstration that physical and economic pressures
operate in surprisingly similar ways, and that there are
well founded grounds for viewing them as comparable. It
thereby makes out the case that both kinds of pressures can
plausibly be said to produce coerced labor.
The book argues that ordinarily when we speak about
coercion in labor, even physical coercion, we do not mean
that an employer has physically taken a worker's hand and
forced her/him to perform a task. What we normally mean
is that an employer has confronted a worker with a difficult
if not impossible choice, work up to my standards or be
whipped, work up to my standards or be placed in solitary
confinement. In most cases the work that is performed is
the result of a decision by the worker that as awful as the
work is it is a better choice (under the limited set of choices
with which s/he is confronted) than the whipping or the
6. Id.
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confinement. When we say that this worker did not perform
the work voluntarily, that s/he was coerced into it, really
had no choice, we do not actually mean that s/he did not
make a kind of choice, what we mean is that we consider
that kind of choice so illegitimate that we call the work
involuntary. As a logical matter, it is possible to say that
this worker did make a free choice. Consequently when we
characterize the labor as coerced, we are making a
normative judgment that the choice set with which the
worker was confronted was so illegitimate that we will not
permit the decision to labor to be described as voluntary.
What this way of looking at labor coercion reveals is
precisely why labor performed as a result of harsh economic
choices can continue to be characterized as free and
voluntary. But it also reveals that economic pressures to
labor do not operate all that differently from so-called
physical or legal pressures. Why would a wage worker labor
under appalling conditions for long hours at starvation
wages? Because s/he is confronted with a choice set that
makes the labor, as bad as it is, a better choice under the
circumstances than the alternatives: work or starve, work
or become homeless, work or go cold, work or try to qualify
for a pittance on welfare, or in the case of immigrant miners
laboring in isolated western towns, work or try to walk
away from the town through hundreds of miles of
wilderness.
The continuing controversy over describing labor
offered under economic pressure as coerced arises from at
least two sources. First, there is wide disagreement about
whether particular choice sets, work or go without food,
work or go cold, etc. should be viewed as creating choices
that are so illegitimate that we as a society will not permit
a decision to labor under these choices to be described as
voluntary. But second and perhaps more importantly there
is wide disagreement about whether economic choice sets
are ever so limited. Aren't there always other choices for
those with initiative? Nevertheless, to the extent that it
can be shown that work is performed as the result of a
choice to avoid going cold or to lose one's home there is a
strong case to be made that such a choice should be
considered so illegitimate that we ought not to permit it to
be described as voluntary in precisely the same way we
refuse to permit a decision to perform work to avoid bodily
confinement to be described as voluntary. Let me add one
899
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point about the argument of the book. It goes on to show
that to an important extent both in the case of bodily
coercion and economic coercion it is law that places some
people in a position to force other people to make these
kinds of hard choices between labor and very disagreeable
alternatives to labor. For a more complete account of these
arguments please consult the text of the book.7
Let me turn now to some of the criticisms leveled
against the book. Nearly all of them are based either on
serious misreadings of the text or on arguments that will
not withstand a moment's scrutiny. In one place, for
example, the reviewer says of the definition of coercion
offered in the previous paragraph that "it remains unclear
as to what, if anything, might be excluded from that
definition. Would a corporate executive who feels
'compelled' by the Chairman of the Board to give up his
stock options or take a pay cut because of disappointing
earnings estimates really be a victim of economic coercion?"
I only wish that the reviewer had tried a little harder to
understand the argument of this section of the book because
it might have helped him lend a little greater rigor to his
own work. Even his formulation of the criticism reflects
deep conceptual confusion. Economic as well as bodily
pressure is a matter of degree. Both depend upon precisely
how disagreeable the choices confronting a worker are. A
worker forced to choose between continued hard labor and
one day of solitary confinement might not find one day of
confinement more disagreeable than continued hard labor.
But a worker forced to choose between hard labor and one
year of solitary confinement might well decide that hard
labor is less disagreeable than a year of solitary
confinement. We would say that the coercive pressure is
much greater in the second situation than in the first. The
same is true of so-called economic pressure. What is
different about the executive and an ordinary worker is
precisely how disagreeable the alternatives are to the work
they are offered. In the case of an ordinary worker these
alternatives may be. to continue mind numbing work at
poverty wages, try to qualify for a pittance on welfare, or
face homelessness. The alternatives facing executives are
normally quite different, work harder without stock options
7. See STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 20-26.
8. See Peck, supra note 1, at 212.
900 [Vol. 51
2003] CONTRACTING COERCION: A RESPONSE
or live on $5 million in accumulated savings-until you can
find another lucrative executive position. What is different
about the choices facing executives and workers is precisely
how much more disagreeable the alternatives to work are in
the one case than they are in the other. The full argument
about economic coercion is laid out in the Introductory
chapter on pages 20-26 of the text.
Part of the argument in this section is to show that law
plays a crucial role in shaping the alternatives ordinary
workers face. Poor law and vagrancy law have always been
especially important in shaping these alternatives for
ordinary workers. On page 22 of the text, I offer examples
drawn from nineteenth-century English experience to drive
home this point. Other historians, Amy Stanley
prominently among them, have recently produced vivid
demonstrations of just how useful vagrancy law proved in
the United States in the post-bellum North to compel so-
called free wage labor.
The reviewer also claims that aside from court cases,
the voices of contemporary labor are largely absent from the
book. I believe any fair-minded reader would conclude that
is simply not so. The voices of workers and advocates for
workers are quoted throughout the book, from the 1820s
when an initial effort was mounted to modify the English
Master and Servant Acts, through the 1840s when labor
attacked attempts made by Parliament to expand the scope
of the Acts, to the 1860s when labor first mounted a
sustained campaign to have the Acts changed. Indeed,
these voices are an important part of my story of how
workers came to refuse to acquiesce in the continued use of
criminal sanctions under the Master and Servant Acts.
Nor do I believe any fair minded reader could
conceivably conclude that I endorse in the slightest degree
Frederick Jackson Turner's argument that labor in the
American West was free because land was freely available.
The entire thrust of my book is to show that land/labor
ratios had little to do with whether labor was subjected to
bodily coercion. Whether land was abundant or scarce
employers had reasons to want to possess this kind of power
over workers under a wide variety of market conditions.
Whether employers possessed such power depended upon
decisions made by the polities of different states for a
variety of reasons (see above) other than land/labor ratios.
Nor could any fair-minded reader conceivably conclude that
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I argue that bodily coercion was more common in the
metropolitan core than in the periphery. The book argues
that bodily coercion was not limited to the periphery but
also occurred in the metropolitan manufacturing homeland.
It most certainly does not argue that coerced labor was
more common in the metropolis than in the periphery.
Let me conclude by addressing two final points the
reviewer makes. The reviewer questions whether the
American anti-slavery movement of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries can explain the differences
between the continued English willingness to use criminal
sanctions for labor contract breaches and the refusal in the
American North after the 1830s to permit such sanctions.
Britain after all had a powerful abolitionist movement of its
own. But there were two crucial differences between
conditions in Britain and conditions in the northern United
States. Britain did not have domestic slavery. British
abolitionism was aimed at British slavery overseas. At the
time of the American Revolution nearly all northern states
had slave populations. The confrontation with slavery in
the American North was a confrontation with an institution
with which northerners lived their daily lives. It was not a
confrontation with an abstract institution that existed
somewhere else. As northerners moved painfully and slowly
to rid themselves of slavery, they were forced to address
and forbid practices, such as indentured servitude, that
people could use to preserve slavery. It was only as a result
of this very concrete, painful and extended struggle with
domestic slavery that northerners gradually hammered out
a new view of criminal sanctions to enforce labor contracts.
The second crucial difference is that by the 1820s many
American states had expanded their suffrage to include
white working class men. The same thing did not happen in
England until much later in the nineteenth century.
Indeed, one of the critical factors that finally made possible
the repeal of criminal sanctions to enforce labor contracts in
England in 1875 was the extension of the suffrage to male
urban workers under the Second Reform Bill in 1867.
Finally, the reviewer criticizes my statement that
although "many nineteenth-century working people, in the
United States as well as in England... denounce[ed] all
wage labor as coerced labor" and commonly referred to it as
"1wage slavery," nevertheless "'wage slavery' was considered
'free labor' by nearly everyone, at least insofar as it stood in
[Vol. 51902
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contrast to serfdom and real slavery."9 It is typical of the
reviewer's method that he omits the final clause of the last
sentence, then asserts (incorrectly) that I cite no
contemporary workers for this proposition-only Karl Marx.
A quick check would have revealed that the next sentence
on the very same page quotes a contemporary English coal
miner and labor advocate, Richard Fynes, for this very
proposition. ° Moreover, it is slightly preposterous to
dismiss Karl Marx as a voice for English labor during this
period.
The reviewer goes on to suggest that I should have
consulted genuine labor voices of the time like Richard
Oastler who would have made it perfectly clear that "wage
slavery" could not possibly have been referred to as "free
labor." Now Oastler is an interesting case. He was not a
member of the working classes himself nor from a working
class background but was converted to Tory Radicalism as a
young man and dedicated himself to advocating on behalf of
those who were less fortunate than he. He became a
powerful voice for labor, mounting campaigns to pass a ten
hour bill, abolish child labor, and repeal the poor law
reforms of 1832. He also mounted a march of the "factory
slaves" and repeatedly denounced the treatment of "white
slaves" in wage labor as worse than the treatment accorded
to black slaves." But did Oastler also refer to "wage
slavery" as "free labor"? Here is what Oastler observed as
he testified before a Select Parliamentary Committee in
1834. He said, "I am sure the present effect of free labour is
and death... 2 I can only hope that thepoverty, distress eth., nolyhp a 
reviewer exercises greater care in the way he goes about
constructing his own scholarship than he has in
constructing his review of mine.
9. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 13.
10. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 13, 13 n.26.
11. See CECIL DRIVER, TORY RADICAL: THE LIFE OF RICHARD OASTLER (Oxford
University Press, 1946); RICHARD OASTLER, KING OF FACTORY CHILDREN: SIX
PAMPHLETS, 1835-1861, 121 notes (Arno Press 1972).
12. Quoted in E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
298 (London 1964) (emphasis added).
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